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COMMENTAIRE
FREE MOVEMENT OF GOODS IN THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY : A CRITIQUE OF THE JURISPRUDENCE
ON ARTICLE 30 OF THE TREATY OF ROME
par Ian B. LEE* 
L'article 30 du Traité de Rome interdit «les restrictions quantitatives à
l'importation, ainsi que toutes mesures d'effet équivalent», parmi les États
membres de la Communauté européenne. Selon l'auteur, I'interprétation
excessivement englobante que la Cour de justice des communautés européennes
a donnée à la notion de «mesures d'effet équivalent» entraîne la conclusion que
toute législation nationale est susceptible d'entraver le commerce
intracommunautaire. L'auteur analyse les fondements théoriques de l'approche
véhiculée par la Cour, et affirme que cette approche s'est montrée déficiente
dans une quadrilogie d'arrêts dans lesquels on prétendait que des lois relatives
à l'observance du dimanche contrevenaient à l'article 30. La Cour a tenté de
diminuer la portée de l'article 30 en assouplissant les critères de la dérogation
au principe de la libre circulation des marchandises. Toutefois, I'auteur soutient
que la Cour ne peut éviter de réviser ses arrêts antérieurs sur l'article 30 et que,
dans l'intérêt de la certitude et de la stabilité, la Cour devrait le faire
explicitement.
                        
Article 30 of the Treaty of Rome prohibits «quantitative restrictions on
imports and all measures having equivalent effect», among the Member States
of the European Community. The author suggests that the excessively broad
interpretation given by the European Court of Justice to the phrase «measures
having equivalent effect» implies that virtually all national legislation is capable
of hindering intra-Community trade. Following a discussion of the theoretical
basis for the Court's reasoning, the author maintains that the inadequacy of the
Court's approach became evident in a series of recent cases in which Sunday
observance legislation was alleged to violate Article 30. The Court has tried to
reduce the scope of Article 30 by relaxing the criteria necessary to justify a
derogation from the principle of the free movement of goods. However, the
author argues that the Court cannot avoid reconsidering its earlier rulings on
Article 30, and that, in the interests of certainty and stability, it should do so
expressly.
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     1. Carnation Co. v. Québec Agricultural Marketing Board, [1968] S.C.R. 238 [hereinafter
Carnation].  See also G. Rémillard, Le Fédéralisme canadien, vol. 1 (Montréal :
Québec/Amérique, 1983) at 367-68.
     2. Case 145/88, Torfaen B.C. v. B & Q plc, [1990] 1 All E.R. 129 (E.C.J.) [hereinafter
Torfaen]; Case C-312/89, Union départementale des syndicats CGT de l’Aisne v. Sidef
Conforama, [1991] E.C.R. I-997 [hereinafter Conforama]; Case C-332/89, Criminal
Proceedings against Marchandise, [1991] E.C.R. I-1027 [hereinafter Marchandise]; Case
C-169/91, Stoke-on-Trent C.C. v. B & Q plc, [1992] E.C.R. I-6654 [hereinafter Stoke-on-
Trent].
Introduction
Consider the following scenario.  Having seen Edwards Books and Art
Ltd. lose its appeal in the Supreme Court of Canada under the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms, another Ontario bookseller decides to challenge the
provincial Retail Business Holidays Act under the Constitution Act, 1867.  The
bookseller’s lawyers argue that the obligation to close on Sundays and other
public holidays reduces the quantity of books sold from outside the province,
and therefore constitutes an unconstitutional infringement on interprovincial
trade.
Does this argument seem farfetched?  After more than a century of
litigation on the division of powers, it is difficult to imagine such an argument
being taken seriously today in Canada.  There is little doubt that provincial
regulation of local businesses is intra vires, regardless of its incidental effects
on the pattern of interprovincial trade.1
For this reason, Canadians may be surprised to learn that according to
the Court of Justice of the European Communities (hereinafter ECJ or Court of
Justice), national Sunday closing legislation is an obstacle to the free movement
of goods among the Member States of the European Community, and violates
the Treaty of Rome unless it can be demonstrated to be a justifiable derogation
from the principle.  
It will be argued that if the Court of Justice means what it says in the
«Sunday Trading cases»,2 its approach to the free movement of goods is not
justified.  The fact that the ECJ’s analysis in these judgments appears to be
based on a credible interpretation of its own jurisprudence serves only to
demonstrate that the approach taken to the free movement of goods was
defective from the beginning.  Indeed, the Court of Justice’s early enthusiasm
for a broad reading of Article 30, the Treaty’s basic provision on import barriers,
has come back to haunt the ECJ in the Sunday Trading cases.
This paper analyzes the Court of Justice’s approach to Article 30.  It
begins with a brief look at the context of the provision (Section I).  Next the
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     3. For general information on the European Community, see J. Steiner, Textbook on EEC Law,
2d ed. (London : Blackstone, 1990).
     4. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (Rome, 25 March 1957).
     5. Two other treaties created common markets in specific products.  The name «European
Community» includes the common markets and institutions of all three treaties, which have
since been merged.
     6. The newest reforms to the EC, contained in the Treaty of Maastricht, include significant
modifications to the institutional framework as well as a Social Policy Agreement and a
number of non-justiciable legal principles and political commitments.  However, the
amendments should not affect the operation of Article 30 of the EEC Treaty or the role of
the ECJ in interpreting it.  See further D. Curtin, «The Constitutional Structure of the Union:
A Eu ro p e  o f  B i t s  an d  P i ec e s » ( 1 9 9 3 )  3 0  C . M . L . R e v .  1 7 .
development of the jurisprudence applicable to Article 30 is critically reviewed
and the Court of Justice’s theory of the role of the Article in the Common
Market is measured against other theories (Section II).  The final section (III)
discusses the application of the ECJ’s jurisprudence to the Sunday Trading cases
and suggests that the decisions can be defended more easily if the Court of
Justice is taken not to mean what it says.
I. Context
Although a lively debate is carried on in the literature over whether the
European Community (EC) is in the nature of a federation or an international
organization, it is sufficient for our purpose to describe the EC as consisting
essentially of two elements : a common market, and a collection of institutions
devoted to the protection and development of the common market.3  By the
Treaty of Rome (or EEC Treaty),4 signed in 1957, the original Member States
created a common market characterized by the free movement of goods, labour
and capital within the bloc, and established rules regarding, inter alia, a
common external tariff and a common competition policy.5  The free movement
of goods in particular is protected in the Treaty of Rome by a host of provisions
prohibiting customs duties and other restrictive measures between the Member
States (Articles 9 to 37).  
The European Community owes much of its progress towards
integration to the institutions which the Member States created to defend and
develop the common market.  Although the members of the EC are sovereign
States, the institutional framework they created has some characteristics of a
federation, including an autonomous legal system and a Court of Justice.6
Because of an effective institutional enforcement mechanism, Articles 9 to 37
are a powerful weapon against protectionism on the part of Member States.
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     7. D. Wyatt and A. Dashwood, The Substantive Law of the EEC (London : Sweet & Maxwell,
1980) at 26 [hereinafter Wyatt and Dashwood].
     8. Case 74/76, Iannelli v. Meroni, [1977] E.C.R. 557 at 575-76; L. Defalque and G.
Vandersanden, «La notion de mesure d’effet équivalant à une restriction quantitative (art.
30 du Traité C.E.E.)» (1984) 103 J. des Trib. 489 at 490.
     9. Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, [1964] E.C.R. 1141 at 1158, [1964] C.M.L.R. 425.
     10. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, Article 27.  See also Wyatt and Dashwood,
supra, note 7 at 28.
     11. By the English doctrine of implied repeal (lex posterior derogat priori), any inconsistent
subsequent legislation is deemed to have impliedly repealed the previous legislation.  See
Ellen Street Estates v. Minister of Health, [1934] K.B. 590; O.H. Phillips and P. Jackson,
Constitutional and Administrative Law, 7th ed. (London : Sweet & Maxwell, 1987) at 71-74.
     12. Garland v. British Rail Engineering, [1983] 2 A.C. 751, per Lord Diplock.
A. The Community Legal System
At the centre of the enforcement mechanism are the «twin pillars» of the
Community legal system, namely the direct applicability and primacy of
Community law.7  The principle of direct applicability means that the Treaty
creates rights which individuals and enterprises can assert in their national
courts.  In particular, Articles 30 to 34, dealing with non-tariff barriers within
the Community, have had direct effect as of the end of the «transition period».8
Thus, unlike the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement or the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade, the EEC Treaty «has created its own legal system which
… [is] an integral part of the legal systems of the Member States and which their
courts are bound to apply.»9  In this way, the implementation of the norms of the
Common Market cannot be thwarted as easily by States refusing for political
reasons to pursue claims on behalf of their nationals.
The second «pillar» is the principle that Community law prevails over
the national law of the Member States.  Even in international law generally, the
failure to comply with a treaty is not justifiable on the grounds of a conflict with
the obligor State’s domestic law.10  When this principle is combined with direct
applicability, the result is that individuals have access to (national) courts which
can decline to apply national law to the extent that it conflicts with Community
law.  
Since a domestic court’s authority to set aside national law is itself
granted by national law — for example, the domestic legislation implementing
the EEC Treaty — the principle of supremacy is more fragile than it may appear.
In the United Kingdom, for example, the constitutional principle of
parliamentary sovereignty means that Parliament is incapable of alienating its
right to pass legislation inconsistent with the EEC Treaty.11  Nevertheless, even
in the U.K., the House of Lords has indicated that courts should «construe»
national legislation so as to conform to Community law, «no matter how wide
a departure from the prima facie meaning may be needed.»12
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     13. See L. Gormley, Case Comment on Torfaen Borough Council v. B & Q plc (1990) 27
C.M.L. Rev. 141; J. Steiner, «Drawing the Line : Uses and Abuses of Article 30 EEC»
(1992) 29 C.M.L. Rev. 749 at 750 (text accompanying note 10).
     14. The nine versions of the Treaty of Rome, each in a different national language, are equally
authentic.  See M. Hilf, «The Role of Comparative Law in the Jurisprudence of the Court of
Justice of the European Communities» in A. de Mestral et al., eds., The Limitation of Human
Rights in Comparative Constitutional Law (Cowansville : Yvon Blais, 1986) at 566.
     15. See P. Oliver, Free Movement of Goods in the EEC, 2d ed. (London : European Law Centre,
1988) at 38-56.
     16. Case 7/68, Commission v. Italy, [1968] E.C.R. 617 at 626, [1969] C.M.L.R. 1 at 8.  It is not
necesary for our purposes to investigate in greater detail the limits of the concept of goods.
For a review of the issues, the reader is referred to Oliver, supra, note 15 at ch. 2, or to A.
Mattera, «Libre circulation des marchandises et articles 30 à 36 du Traité C.E.E.» [1976]
R.M.C. 500 at 501-502.
It seems that as a practical matter, if national courts are to be expected
to go along with the «primacy» of Community law, it is important for these laws,
including decisions of the Court of Justice, to be perceived as legitimate.  The
ECJ in particular must, in interpreting the Treaty, render reasoned decisions
based on the effective implementation of the Treaty, and not on extraneous
concerns which are properly matters for the national jurisdiction.13
B. Structure of the Prohibition against Import Barriers
At issue in the Sunday Trading cases was the interpretation of Article 30,
which provides a broadly worded prohibition on non-tariff import barriers
between Member States.  The English version14 of Article 30 reads as follows :
«Quantitative restrictions on imports and all measures having
equivalent effect shall, without prejudice to the following provisions,
be prohibited between Member States.»
The «following provisions» referred to in Article 30 relate in particular to a
transition period, since elapsed, for the gradual elimination of quantitative
restrictions.  In addition, Article 34 contains a provision identical to Article 30
except that it applies to restrictions on exports.  
Article 30 binds Member States and their agents, as well as the
institutions of the Community,15 and applies to trade in «goods», which are
«products which can be valued in money and which are capable, as such, of
forming the subject of commercial transactions.»16  
Derogation from the principle of the free movement of goods is
authorized by Article 36 on certain enumerated grounds.  Article 36 reads as
follows :
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     17. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B of the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), c. 11 [hereinafter the «Charter»].
     18. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1950) 213
U.N.T.S. 222.  See further the survey of Deschênes J. in «Le rôle du droit comparé dans
l’évolution récente des droits de la personne au Canada» in de Mestral et al., supra, note 14
at 590.
     19. Commission v. Italy, supra, note 16.
     20. See C. Rogerson, «Section One of the Charter» (unpublished, May 1991), and the cases cited
therein, especially R. v. Edwards Books, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713, Irwin Toy v. Québec (A.G.),
[1989] 1 S.C.R. 927, R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, and McKinney v. University of
Guelph, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229.
«The provisions of Articles 30 to 34 shall not preclude prohibitions or
restrictions on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on
grounds of public morality, public policy [ordre public] or public
security; the protection of health and life of humans, animals or
plants; the protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic
or archaeological value; or the protection of industrial and
commercial property.  Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not,
however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised
restriction on trade between Member States.»
The implications of Article 36 will be discussed in greater detail below.
At this point, it is sufficient to note that the analysis of a provision of national
legislation challenged as an import restriction is a two-stage process.  First, it
must be shown that the provision is a quantitative restriction on imports or that
it has an effect equivalent to a quantitative restriction.  If the measure is
demonstrated to have a restrictive effect on imports within the meaning of
Article 30, it is incompatible with the Treaty unless it is justified under Article
36.  
A two-stage approach has of course also been adopted in Canada for the
scrutiny of legislation for conformity with the Charter,17 and is common in
constitutions and human rights instruments, notably the European Convention
on Human Rights.18  As a corollary of the theory that fundamental documents
should be given a large and liberal interpretation, provisions containing
derogations are usually interpreted narrowly.  In principle, therefore, if a
measure prima facie violates the free movement of goods, the standard of
justification is strict; accordingly, Article 36 receives a narrow construction.19
However, the Canadian experience with section 1 of the Charter has
shown that in some cases the legislature is not held to the stringent standard.20
Although in the context of the Charter this relaxation of the justificatory
standard is often meant to free the legislature to enact laws to protect vulnerable
groups, for example, a more pragmatic explanation can also be advanced.  An
unduly «expansive» interpretation of the so-called substantive provisions of the
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     21. R. v. Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 at 344.  See K. Mahoney, «R. v. Keegstra : A
Rationale for Regulating Pornography?» (1992) 37 McGill L.J. 242 at 250.  For a recent
judicial application of what Wilson J. refers to as «a serious and non-trivial approach» to the
rights-conferring provisions of the Charter, see Lavigne v. OPSEU, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211 at
259-60, per Wilson J; R. v. Committee for the Commonwealth of Canada, [1991] 1 S.C.R.
139 at 232-33, per McLachlin J.
     22. Case 130/80, Fabriek voor Hoogwaardige Voedingsprodukten Kelderman B.V., [1981]
E.C.R. 527.
Charter will often make it appropriate to adopt an analysis under section 1 which
is more deferential towards the State.  In other words, an interpretation of the
rights-conferring provision which «overshoot[s] the actual purpose of the right
or freedom in question» would compel the court to expand the derogation in
section 1 of the Charter.21
Thus, the challenge facing the European Court of Justice in interpreting
Article 30 is as follows : if the derogations are to be interpreted restrictively,
then the Court of Justice should ensure that whenever a measure is held to be
inconsistent with Article 30, it truly does conflict with a fundamental principle
of the Common Market so that it can be held to a strict standard of justification.
Unfortunately, the Court of Justice has attempted to maintain, simultaneously,
an excessively broad interpretation of Article 30 and an extremely narrow
interpretation of the derogation contained in Article 36, while rendering
decisions which are acceptable, in the result, to the Member States.  It is
respectfully submitted that this attempt to please everyone has been made at the
expense of logic and certainty, especially in the treatment of so-called
indistinctly applicable measures.
II. Interpretation of Article 30
A. Indistinctly Applicable Measures and the Court of Justice :
From Dassonville to Cinéthèque
A measure is indistinctly applicable if it does not distinguish between
national and imported products.  Thus, for example, a rule on the «dry matter
content» of bread marketed in a Member State is indistinctly applicable,22 while
a regulation imposing a product standard only on bread imported from another
Member State is not.  
It is true that the text of Article 30 does not expressly categorize
measures as distinctly or indistinctly applicable.  Nevertheless, while there is
general support for the proposition that measures which are distinctly applicable
are banned by Article 30, there is less agreement on the status of indistinctly
applicable measures.
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     23. Directive 70/50, J.O. 1970 L 13/29, Article 3.
     24. Case 8/74, [1974] E.C.R. 837 at 852, para. 5 [hereinafter Dassonville].
     25. E.L. White, «In Search of the Limits to Article 30 of the EEC Treaty» (1989) 26 C.M.L.Rev.
235 at 235-36.  See, for example Case 249/81, Commission v. Ireland, [1982] E.C.R. 4005
[«Buy Irish» campaign].
     26. See Steiner, Textbook, supra, note 3 at 72-74 and Oliver, supra, note 15 at 75 et seq., and
the authorities cited in those texts.
For example, despite the Commission of the European Communities’
pronouncement in 1970 that indistinctly applicable measures were not
inconsistent with the free movement of goods unless they had a disproportionate
effect on imports,23 the Court of Justice settled in 1974 on a broad formulation
according to which the indistinctly applicable character of a measure is
irrelevant to whether it is «measure having equivalent effect».
The Court of Justice’s formulation, set out in Procureur du Roi v.
Dassonville, has become the classic definition of the measures envisaged by
Article 30 :
«All trading rules … which are capable of hindering, directly or
indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-Community trade are to be
considered as measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative
restrictions.24»
This definition is capable of a very wide scope.  In the first place,
«trading rule», or «réglementation commerciale» in the French version, includes
any regulation of business, not merely international trade regulation.  Indeed, the
language of Article 30 supports the view that government economic activity
other than business regulation is also capable of constituting «measures having
an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions».25  Moreover, it is unnecessary
that a measure be distinctly applicable or even that it protect domestic producers
for it to be «capable of hindering» (or «susceptible d’entraver») the flow of
goods across boundaries within the Community.  By a literal reading of the
strongly worded test in Dassonville, all that is necessary is that the presence of
the measure be capable of leading to a reduction in imports.  
Admittedly, this was not the only possible interpretation of Dassonville.
It would not be unreasonable to read «capable of hindering … intra-Community
trade» as requiring that the measure either be distinctly applicable or have a
more severe impact on imports than on domestic products.  A broad
interpretation of Article 30 was not even necessary to decide the case in
Dassonville : the impugned measure was a distinctly applicable measure which
imposed a material burden specifically on imported products.  Nevertheless, the
Court of Justice has subsequently interpreted the Dassonville formulation in a
manner consistent with its expansive tone and wording.26
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     27. This position was advocated, for example, by L. Defalque, «Le concept de discrimination
en matière de libre circulation des marchandises» (1987) 23 C.D.E. 471 at 487.
     28. Commission v. Italy, supra, note 16; Case 153/78, Commission v. Federal Republic of
Germany, [1979] E.C.R. 2555.
     29. Case 113/80, Commission v. Ireland, [1981] E.C.R. 1638.  See also Defalque, supra, note
27 at 486.
     30. Case 251/78, Denkavit Futtermittel v. Minister of Agriculture, [1979] E.C.R. 3369.
     31. See, for example, Case 104/75, Officier van Justitie v. De Peijper, [1976] E.C.R. 613 at 635-
36.
     32. Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral A.G. v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, [1979]
E.C.R. 649 [hereinafter Cassis de Dijon].
     33. See L.N. Brown, The Court of Justice of the European Communities, 3d ed. (London : Sweet
& Maxwell, 1989) at 314.
It will be recalled that Article 36 permits derogation from Article 30 on
certain grounds, namely
«public morality, public policy [ordre public] or public security; the
protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants; the
protection of national treasures possessing artistic, historic or
archaeological value; or the protection of industrial and commercial
property…»
It is arguable that if interpreted liberally enough, Article 36 could counteract the
broad Dassonville formula.27  However, the Court of Justice has severely limited
the scope of Article 36, convinced that any measure infringing Article 30 is a
violation of a fundamental legal rule of the Community.  Accordingly, the Court
of Justice has declared the grounds of derogation enumerated in Article 36 to be
exhaustive and each of the grounds has received a narrow interpretation.28  Thus,
many desirable objectives, such as consumer protection and the prevention of
unfair competition, have been held to be ineligible.29
Moreover, the burden of showing that a measure is saved by Article 36
is on the Member State.30  Even if the objective is on the list, the requirement of
proportionality means that a measure cannot be justified under Article 36 if
another equally effective measure is available which would impair the free
movement of goods less, or if the degree of impairment is out of proportion to
the objective.31
The first major opportunity to reconsider Dassonville came five years
after that decision, in the case referred to as Cassis de Dijon.32  This case
involved a challenge to a regulation on the minimum alcoholic content of fruit
liqueurs marketed in Germany.  The Court of Justice is not bound by its own
past decisions,33 and was free to overrule Dassonville by adopting a narrower
definition of a hindrance to trade.  Alternatively, the Court of Justice could have
adopted a more permissive approach to the derogation by overruling its previous
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     34. Ibid. at paragraph 8.
     35. See P. VerLoren van Themaat, «La libre circulation des marchandises après l’arrêt «Cassis
de Dijon»» (1982) 18 C.D.E. 123 at 131-32.  There is, however, a school of opinion
suggesting that even though Cassis de Dijon does not mention Article 36, in fact the new
grounds are merely an illustration of possible Article 36 derogations, possibly falling within
«public policy» : see Oliver, supra, note 15 at 92.
     36. Cassis de Dijon, supra, note 32 at para. 14.
     37. Oliver, supra, note 15 at 87.  Consumer protection and the protection of fair competition are
two examples of objectives which qualify as exigences impératives according to the
judgment in Cassis de Dijon but which cannot justify a derogation under Article 36 : see
note 29, supra.
     38. Case 182/84, Proceedings against Miro B.V., [1986] 3 C.M.L.R. 545.
     39. The minimum alcoholic content for fruit liqueurs was set to a level low enough that the
German product complied but sufficiently high that the rival French product fell short.  See
Oliver, supra, note 15 at 88.
decisions on Article 36.  Instead, however, the decision in Cassis de Dijon
muddied the waters because it made no mention of either Dassonville or Article
36.  The key passage from the judgment is in the following terms :
«Obstacles to movement within the Community resulting from
disparities between the national laws relating to the marketing of the
products in question must be accepted in so far as those provisions
may be recognised as being necessary in order to satisfy mandatory
requirements relating in particular to the effectiveness of fiscal
supervision, the protection of public health, the fairness of commercial
transactions and the defence of the consumer.34»
It is now generally accepted that the Court of Justice did not implicitly
overrule Dassonville or its Article 36 jurisprudence, and that the judgment
instead created a new derogation internal to Article 30 itself.35  The new
exception was for what the Court of Justice called «mandatory requirements».
It is clear from the French term, «exigences impératives», that the derogation is
for objectives sufficiently important to justify an infringement of principles
fundamental to the Common Market.36  Unlike the enumeration in Article 36,
the list of exigences impératives is not exhaustive and, as the above excerpt
shows, includes a number of legislative objectives which were excluded from
Article 36.37  Nevertheless, legislation aimed at an exigence impérative remains
subject to the same strict test of proportionality as under Article 36 since it
derogates from an essential Community principle.38
Cassis de Dijon was important because unlike the rule in Dassonville,
the impugned product standard in Cassis de Dijon was applicable both to
imports and to national products.  Despite its indistinct applicability, however,
the restriction in Cassis de Dijon was demonstrated to have the effect of
protecting a local German industry from a competing French product.39
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421 at 421.
     43. N. Colchester, «A Survey of Europe’s Internal Market» supplement to The Economist (9 July
1988) at S7.
As the above excerpt from the judgment suggests, the ECJ chose not to
identify the protective character of the regulations as the reason for their
unacceptability, indicating instead that the mere existence of non-harmonized
national regulations was an obstacle to trade.  The Court of Justice further held
that to remedy this kind of trade barrier, it is not sufficient for a Member State
to treat imported and national products equally; in the absence of harmonization,
Article 30 requires the mutual recognition of product standards.  The Court of
Justice reinforced its point with this observation :
«There is therefore no valid reason why, provided that they have been
lawfully produced and marketed in one of the member-States,
alcoholic beverages should not be introduced into any other member-
State…40»
For its part, the Commission responded to the judgment by sending the Member
States a letter interpreting and reformulating the statement as a positive duty to
admit :
«Tout produit importé d’un État membre doit être en principe admis
sur le territoire de l’État membre importateur s’il est légalement
fabriqué … et commercialisé sur le territoire [du pays
d’exportation].41»
These statements caused consternation in some economic circles,42 although The
Economist viewed the Cassis de Dijon court’s emphasis on harmonization and
mutual recognition as «a contribution to the great market [that] should be toasted
regularly in kir.»43  
Though the Commission framed the Member State’s obligation under
Article 30 as a duty to admit, it should be pointed out that the regulation in
Cassis de Dijon was technically not a refusal to admit certain products onto the
territory of the importing state, since it prohibited neither importation nor
production; rather, it was a rule about the characteristics of products marketed
on the territory.  What the judgment recognizes is that if a product cannot be
sold within the territory then imports of the product have been blocked just as
effectively as if they had been refused entry at the border.  However, the
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Commission v. Italy, [1981] E.C.R. 3019 [law prohibits sale of acetic acid not made from
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v. France, [1988] E.C.R. 793 [non-protectionist ban on substitute milk powder violates
Article 30].
connection between marketing and admission is rarely as clear as it was in
Cassis de Dijon, especially when there is no evidence of protective effect or
protectionist intent.  And in these more ambiguous cases, where a marketing rule
merely has an incidental effect on sales of imports, it is not clear why the duty
to admit should require the marketing regulation not to be extended equally to
imported products.
For example, in the case of a ban on the delivery of baked goods at night
(Oebel) or on the serving of strong alcoholic beverages in a hotel (Blesgen),44 it
was impossible to find either a discriminatory purpose or a disproportionate
effect on imports.  The Court of Justice decided in these cases that it was not
even necessary to refer to exigences impératives, holding simply that each
measure had
«… en réalité pas de lien avec l’importation des produits et [n’était]
donc pas de nature à entraver le commerce entre États membres.45»
The problem with this reasoning is that in Cassis de Dijon, it could
equally be said that the regulation was in connection with the sale of products,
not their importation.  There is arguably no basis for finding that the provision
in Cassis de Dijon — a ban on the sale of insufficiently strong alcoholic
beverages — was connected to imports while finding no similar connection in
the ban in Blesgen on sales of strong alcoholic beverages in hotels.46
Consequently, Oebel and Blesgen are now considered to have been exceptions47
to the current of Court of Justice jurisprudence according to which, as a general
rule, even the indistinct application of non-protective marketing restrictions is
a hindrance to trade.48
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Cinéthèque v. Fédération nationale des cinémas français49 played an
important role in confirming the general rule, since unlike the German rule on
fruit liqueurs in Cassis de Dijon, the impugned measure in Cinéthèque was not
protectionist in purpose and had the same impact on foreign and national
producers.  The legislation prohibited the sale of movies in videocassette form
for a short period after the release of the film in cinemas.  The Court of Justice
accepted that the purpose and effect of the legislation was to protect the
cinematographic industry in general, and not the French industry in particular.50
It concluded that in principle, the legislation was inconsistent with the free
movement of goods because of disparities among the Member States’ regulation
in this field, but that it was acceptable as a means of protecting the
cinematographic form.  Thus, in Cinéthèque, the Court of Justice remained true
to the statements in Cassis de Dijon declaring that regulation which is not
harmonized across the Community is prima facie inconsistent with the principle
of the free movement of goods even if it is non-discriminatory.51  
The second important development in Cinéthèque relates to the
derogation created in Cassis de Dijon.  According to the prevailing view, the
Court of Justice did nothing more than make the protection of cinematography
an exigence impérative.52  However, the Court of Justice did not refer even once
in its judgment to the concept of exigences impératives.  It merely held that the
objective was «justified with regard to Community law» and gave no further
explanation.  Thus, we do not truly know whether the ECJ considered the
promotion of cinematography to be of such an «imperative» nature as to warrant
overriding a fundamental principle of the Common Market, whether the measure
was justified under Article 36, or whether the Court of Justice simply conjured
up another, more lenient exception to Article 30.  
Despite the uncertainty surrounding the scope of the derogation
following the cryptic judgment in Cinéthèque, the Court of Justice has
consistently indicated that in principle, Article 30 extends to national measures
which are not discriminatory and which do not have a disproportionate impact
on imports.  In the language of the Court of Justice, such measures are
nevertheless «capable of hindering intra-Community trade», in the absence of
harmonization across the Community.  
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B. Indistinctly Applicable Measures and the Canadian Common
Market
It was observed at the beginning of this paper that in Canada, provincial
measures which are not discriminatory and which do not have an excessive
effect on interprovincial trade flows are within the province’s constitutional
vires.  Thus, in Canada, the balance chosen by the courts between the protection
of the common market and the integrity of the legislative jurisdiction of the
provinces reflects a somewhat narrower vision of the free movement of goods
than that adopted by the ECJ.  At this point, it is useful to review briefly the
Canadian jurisprudence in order to explain how the difference in approach arose.
Canada’s equivalent of Article 30 EEC is the so-called «common market
clause» in section 121 of the Constitution Act, 1867.53  It provides :
«All Articles of the Growth, Produce, or Manufacture of any one of
the Provinces shall … be admitted free into each of the other
Provinces.»
It might be thought that section 121 is worded even more broadly than Article
30 : a guarantee that goods shall be «admitted free» is arguably more liberal than
a prohibition against «measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative
restrictions on imports».  Indeed, the wording of section 121 is similar to the
«duty to admit» formulated by the EC Commission in response to Cassis de
Dijon.54  However, section 121 has been interpreted much less liberally than
Article 30 EEC.  In fact, it turns out that Canada’s «common market clause» is
little more than a duty on provinces not to impose tariffs on products from other
provinces.55  
For this reason, section 121 is not useful against non-tariff trade barriers.
Consequently, restrictions on provincial power to enact regulation affecting
trade within the federation have been elaborated principally by reference to the
division of powers in sections 91 and 92.  The basic rule is that provinces may
not enact legislation whose «pith and substance» is the regulation of
interprovincial trade :
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«It is not the possibility that these orders might «affect» the
appellant’s interprovincial trade which should determine their
validity, but, rather, whether they were made «in relation to» the
regulation of [interprovincial] trade and commerce.… The fact of
such impact may be relevant in determining their true aim and
purpose, but it is not conclusive.56»
Thus, provincial legislation is valid as long as its «true purpose» is not to
regulate interprovincial trade.  
Because the main restriction on provincial non-tariff barriers in Canada
is contained in the limits to the provinces’ legislative jurisdiction under section
92-13 rather than the «common market clause», there are two major weaknesses
in Canada’s common market in comparison to that of the EC.  First, the limits
in s. 92-13 bind only the provincial legislatures.  Second, s. 92-13 grants the
provinces a wide leeway to use or spend provincial public property, even if the
purpose of the spending would exceed the provincial regulatory competence.57
In contrast, Article 30 EEC applies to the executive and legislative branches of
government of the Member States and to all institutions of the Community itself,
and makes no explicit distinction between regulatory and non-regulatory
«measures».58  Thus in Canada, discriminatory government procurement
policies, such as those at issue in the recent Ontario-Québec and Québec-New
Brunswick trade conflicts,59 and federally-sanctioned interprovincial trade
barriers, such as those authorized by the Farm Products Marketing Agencies Act,
S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 65, continue to impair the internal market.60
Assuming that section 92-13 applies, the determination of whether it has
been exceeded by a particular measure is approached very differently from the
manner articulated by the ECJ in Dassonville and Cinéthèque.  Whereas the
European Court of Justice considers the purpose of the measure to be irrelevant
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in determining whether it prima facie violates Article 30 EEC, a law’s purpose
will be determinative of its constitutionality under s. 92-13.  A discriminatory
provincial law will probably be beyond the province’s power under s. 92-13
because its aim is to regulate interprovincial trade, while a law with a legitimate
objective relating to the regulation of local commerce will usually be intra vires.
It is true that Carnation suggests that an intention to regulate interprovincial
trade might be imputed to the province on the basis of the effects of the
measure.61  However, assuming that any extraprovincial effects are reasonably
incidental to the aim of the legislation, and that there is no other evidence of an
unconstitutional purpose, the law will be a valid exercise of provincial power.
62
  In particular, indistinctly applicable measures whose purpose and effect are
not discriminatory will not be considered to interfere with Canadian
interprovincial trade, even if they are capable of having an impact on the flow
of goods across boundaries.  In contrast, as previously pointed out, such
measures would violate Article 30 EEC, following Dassonville and Cinéthèque,
unless they could be justified with reference to an imperative national interest
or under Article 36.
C. Article 30 and Harmonization
The main rationale for applying Article 30 to non-discriminatory
indistinctly applicable measures is that in the absence of harmonization they
may constitute barriers to trade.  Article 30, it is often argued, must be construed
so as to further the elimination of these barriers :
«Prise dans son acceptation la plus large, la notion de "libre
circulation des marchandises" doit … être interprétée en fonction de
l'objectif à atteindre, à savoir la réalisation de conditions communes
et uniformes permettant aux produits de circuler entre les pays de la
Communauté comme à l'intérieur d'un marché national.63»
Although this assertion is not without merit, it does not follow that Article 30 is
the proper tool to remove disparities among national legislative régimes.
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To some extent, the purpose of the European Common Market is to
achieve integration for its own sake.64  However, it bears remembering that the
usual justification for a common market is that it generally results in economic
gains for the nations involved.65  
The gains from the removal of trade barriers can be sorted into a number
of categories.  First, the removal of trade barriers permits production of a
particular good to gravitate to areas within the bloc where there is a comparative
advantage in its production.66  This permits producers to realize economies of
scale by serving a larger market.  Equally importantly, quite apart from
economies of scale, shifting production of a good to an area with a comparative
advantage gives rise to a more efficient production pattern across the common
market.67 Hereinafter, these savings will be referred to as arising from the
efficient geographic allocation of production.
Less often mentioned is what may be termed the gain from the
elimination of a «local distortion».  By this expression I mean that a national
trade barrier is also distortive of local consumption decisions, because it is
theoretically equivalent to a production subsidy plus a consumption tax.68  Thus,
the elimination of a tariff or product standard removes a «wedge» from between
relative prices and relative costs in the domestic market, so that the domestic
equilibrium is closer to its efficient point, assuming that the unregulated
equilibrium is efficient in the local market.  The shift in the domestic
equilibrium has consequences for trade flows since any hindrance to overall
consumption restricts in particular the consumption of imports.  
The costs of trade barriers are incurred regardless of whether the barriers
result from protectionism or simply disparities among regulation in the Member
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States.  If national standards differ, even if not for protectionist reasons, and
even if no domestic industry obtains an advantage, the ability of a producer to
serve the entire Community market is impaired, as is the ability of a purchaser
to obtain its goods where they may be produced at the least relative cost.
Similarly, the distortive effects on trade flows which result from the «wedge»
between prices and costs in the national market are also independent of the
protectionist character of the regulation.  It is for this reason that the Court of
Justice in Cassis de Dijon and Cinéthèque considered a protectionist motive or
protective effect to be irrelevant where there was an absence of harmonization
among Member States.
However, once a disparity has been identified as a trade barrier, the
question remains as to what obligation Article 30 imposes on the Member
States.  In a situation where a national standard has been adopted with
protectionist intent, or even where it simply has the effect of protecting a
national market, there is a case for singling it out as responsible for the trade
barrier.  In contrast, in the absence of protectionist motive or protective effect,
the trade barrier cannot be attributed to any of the standards individually.
It may appear at first blush that the Member States adhering to stricter
standards can be blamed for the trade barrier.  This is the position implicit in the
principle of mutual recognition articulated in Cassis de Dijon and Cinéthèque.
It is submitted that this preference for the lowest standard is unjustified.
Suppose, for example, that starting from a position of equal regulation, one
nation passes a law to relax its standard.  As a result, trade between that State
and the others will be restricted, because a rational producer may be induced to
produce a special run for the low-standard market, depending on the offsetting
diseconomies of small scale.  According to Cassis de Dijon and Cinéthèque, all
the other nations would be required to match the new, lower standard, or to
justify their passivity by reference to an imperative national interest.  As
Marenco points out, 
«Le traité n’a pas pour but d’interdire les réglementations en tant que
telles, afin de parvenir à l’uniformité des réglementations par leur
simple suppression.69»
Yet, the interpretation forwarded in Cassis de Dijon and Cinéthèque sets the
stage for a mandatory «race to the bottom».70
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On the other hand, it might be argued that the more rigorous product
standard can be singled out because of the greater magnitude of the trade effects
of its «local distortion».  As I have explained, above, a national standard is
equivalent to a consumption tax and a production subsidy : therefore, the more
strict the regulation, the more «distortive» of overall consumption is the subsidy-
tax combination.  Recall that this distortion affects imports because purchases
of imported products are part of overall consumption.
I would suggest, however, that this argument is not tenable.  The local
distortion accompanying a regulation is of a different nature from any
geographic misallocation of production.  While the latter is a special feature of
protectionism and legislative disparities, the former is the inevitable
consequence of all kinds of government intervention in the economy.  Moreover,
since this part of the trade effect flows exclusively from the fact of domestic
economic regulation, its magnitude is independent of the standards adopted by
the other Member States.  In other words, the effect of the local distortion on
sales of imports in a Member State would be the same regardless of whether
other Member States had no standard, the same standard or a higher standard.
  It is therefore illogical to assign responsibility for the absence of harmonization
on the basis of this trade effect.
In summary, therefore, although a lack of harmonization of regulations
within the Common Market causes a geographic misallocation of production,
this misallocation cannot be attributed to any of the Member States individually.
In particular, it cannot be imputed to those Member States having stricter
regulations.71
Some Euro-scholars scarcely conceal their bias against regulation when
they argue that harmonization can be achieved by means of Article 30.  For
example, in defence of his broad view of the free movement of goods, Mattera
notes with concern
«[c]e phénomène inquiétant et grandissant de l’intervention des États
dans la vie économique de leur pays par des mesures touchant aux
domaines les plus disparates…72»
Yet, unless regulation is per se antithetical to the Common Market, the
«distortive» effects inherent to regulation are not an appropriate basis for
considering a non-discriminatory, non-protective national measure to be
responsible for a trade barrier that arises from legislative disparities.
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Article 30 is too crude an instrument for achieving the goal of
harmonization because it provides no rule for choosing among the competing
standards.  It is significant that pursuant to Article 100A of the Treaty, the EC
Commission is leading efforts to achieve agreement among the Member States
on harmonized legislation.  The Commission’s work would be futile if
harmonization could be achieved through the direct application of Article 30 in
order to invalidate national legislation.  This cannot have been the purpose of
Article 30.
D. The Requirement of Disadvantage
In an article written before the Court of Justice’s decision in Cinéthèque,
Marenco argued that discrimination or disadvantage is necessary to trigger
Article 30.  In his view, the object of Article 30 is not fundamentally to achieve
harmonization, however desirable that objective may be in the context of the
Common Market, but rather
«… d’établir la communication entre les économies et mettre en
concurrence, à parité de conditions, les facteurs de production
nationaux et les facteurs correspondants des autres États membres.73»
Communication and competition between national economies and factors of
production would favour an efficient geographic allocation of resources.  They
would be achieved, as far as possible, by the elimination of national measures
which have discriminatory intent or which place imports at a disadvantage
relative to national products.  Marenco’s theory has been widely rejected by
other academic writers,74 and the Court of Justice clearly opted for
harmonization in Cinéthèque.  It will be argued, however, that the detractors of
the «theory of disadvantage» do not propose any convincing alternative.
Marenco’s concept of discrimination is very broad.  It is, of course,
beyond doubt that the different treatment of situations which are the same is
discriminatory.  Measures which effect «formal discrimination» of this kind, for
example the requirement in Dassonville of a certificate of origin for imported
liquor, automatically fall foul of Article 30.75  However, indistinctly applicable
measures are also capable of discriminating against imported products : an
apparently neutral provision may have a protectionist object or may be more
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onerous in effect for imported products.76  The minimum alcoholic content
regulation in Cassis de Dijon is an example : since the alcoholic content of fruit
liqueurs traditionally varied from region to region, to impose a minimum
standard placed imports at a disadvantage.77  The adverse impact imposed on
imported products by this sort of indistinctly applicable measure is labelled
«discrimination matérielle».  It is argued that only if the provision is formally
discriminatory or has a discriminatory adverse impact is there a trade barrier that
can be attributed to the measure.  
Marenco’s interpretation of Article 30 has the advantage of being
consistent with the Court of Justice’s interpretation of the prohibition on export
restrictions in Article 34, which is phrased virtually identically to Article 30.78
In Groenveld, a case on Article 34 decided shortly after Cassis de Dijon, the
ECJ held that indistinctly applicable production regulations are not measures
having an effect equivalent to export restrictions unless their intent or effect is
discriminatory.79
Many of the writers who disavow Marenco’s theory nevertheless agree
that the scope of Article 30 should be narrower than that adopted by the Court
of Justice in Cassis de Dijon and Cinéthèque, and have proposed their own
criteria for limiting the scope of Article 30 without resorting to the derogation
for exigences impératives.  White, for example, would draw a line between
regulation of the characteristics of products and regulation of the circumstances
in which they are marketed.  According to his theory, only regulation of the first
kind, regarding the size, shape, content, packaging and labelling of a product,
for example, has the potential to hinder the progress of the Common Market.80
Regulation of the second type, relating to the time, place and manner of sale of
a product, for example, is considered innocuous.  
But while White claims that Marenco’s theory is «untenable»,81 it is
submitted that in fact White’s own theory is very similar to it.  Indeed, Marenco
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expressly refers to measures requiring a «manipulation of products» as being
contrary to Article 30 if they are excessive or unnecessary.82
It is important to keep in mind why measures of this kind may be
objectionable.  Rules relating to the characteristics of products often impose
additional costs on importers, for example, if a special production run is required
for a particular national market.  Indeed, if importers are compelled to incur
extra expenses to comply with standards which are already in use in domestic
production, the measure can be attacked on grounds of discrimination
matérielle.  Note, however, that it is not the disparity among the rules in force
in various States, but rather the adjustment cost borne by importers to comply
with a particular rule, which gives rise to discrimination matérielle.  If the
disparity does not result in importers incurring compliance costs which domestic
producers do not have to expend, there is no discriminatory impact and hence,
no violation of Article 30.  
White founds his argument on an analysis of the case law of the Court
of Justice.  In most cases where the ECJ has found a violation of Article 30, the
national regulation related to the characteristics of the product.  However, even
acknowledging that product characteristics regulation is more likely to obstruct
the Common Market than is market circumstances regulation, it is submitted
that the real reason for this correlation is not that characteristics legislation is
inherently incompatible with the Common Market, but that characteristics
legislation more often imposes a special burden on imports.
In some situations, this special burden on imports can be identified even
if the regulation is characterized as regulation of circumstances.  For example,
the Belgian appellant in G.B.-Inno-B.M. v. A.T.A.B.83 complained that it would
be forced to redesign its marketing strategy for the Luxembourg market in order
to comply with local prohibitions on the use of certain kinds of advertising.  The
Court of Justice was persuaded by a similar argument in Oosthoek’s case.84
It may be for this reason that Mortelmans proposed to include, in
addition to characteristics regulation, measures regulating market circumstances
which were not territorially confined.  Thus, a restriction on door-to-door selling
would prima facie violate Article 30, but a rule on store closing hours would
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not.85  Unfortunately, Mortelmans’ explanation for adding territorially-
unconfined market circumstances rules to the scope of Article 30 is cursory and
unclear : perhaps if the rules are confined as to location, then in some sense they
are closer to being a regulation of the use of a fixed place, with the good «only
a secondary consideration».86
Ultimately, however, it is submitted that the key to finding a threat to the
Common Market is in identifying a special burden on imports.  The labels
«characteristics» and «circumstances» proposed by White and Mortelmans are
conclusory.  For example, in cases like Blesgen87 (prohibition on sale of strong
alcoholic beverages in hotels), how do we decide whether a measure relates to
the characteristics of the product or merely the circumstances of its sale?
Important questions, namely the validity of the legislation, should not depend
on a distinction which is indeterminate and which may be subject to
manipulation by legislative drafters.  
In Torfaen, Advocate General Van Gerven expressed a preference for
a test based on whether the effect of the measure was to contribute to the
partitioning of the Common Market into separate national markets.88  He had
drawn this test from the Court of Justice’s interpretation of the prohibition
against anti-competitive collusive activity in Article 85.89  In its jurisprudence
on Article 85, the ECJ had interpreted the phrase «which may affect trade
between Member States» so as to require that an agreement or concerted
practice have an appreciable partitioning effect on intra-Community trade before
it would be subject to the Article.  As Van Gerven noted, both Article 30 and
Article 85 are about the hindering of trade within the Community, and pursue
the same objective, namely to protect the Common Market.90  
There are, however, a number of problems with Van Gerven’s approach.
In the first place, although Articles 30 and 85 both have as their «fundamental
purpose» the protection of the Common Market, it is not clear that they are
protecting it from the same threat.  Moreover, as Van Gerven himself noted, one
of the purposes of the threshold in Article 85 is «to delimit the field of
application» of Community competition law from national competition law.91
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In this context, it makes sense to require potentially restrictive agreements to
have some effect on trade at the Community level before subjecting them to the
Community regime.  
On the other hand, it could be argued that it makes as much sense to
require potentially restrictive national legislation to have a minimum of effect
on trade at the Community level before finding it to be a threat to the Common
Market.  Indeed, both Mortelmans and Steiner considered Van Gerven’s test to
be a disguised de minimis threshold.92  If it is a threshold rule, it has to be
disguised because the Court of Justice expressly rejected the idea of a de
minimis rule for Article 30 in the van de Haar case.93
In many cases, if a national market is «screened off», it will be possible
to say that imported products have been excluded from the market in a manner
which places them at a disadvantage relative to domestic substitutes and thus,
to find discriminatory impact.  This was the case in Cassis de Dijon.  On the
other hand, cases such as Cinéthèque and Commission v. France94 are examples
of situations where measures had the effect of closing off the national market
without any formal or adverse-impact discrimination between national and
imported products.  It is tempting to conclude in these cases that any measure
which tends towards the partitioning of the Common Market cannot possibly be
compatible with the principle of the free movement of goods and the
maintenance of the Common Market.
Ultimately, however, Van Gerven’s theory is vulnerable to the same
criticisms as the theory adopted by the Court of Justice.  The fact is that
whenever regulation in an area is not harmonized, the integration of the
Common Market is imperfect, because partitioning occurs in some degree.  As
I have already argued, this partitioning cannot be attributed to any particular
Member State’s regulation, and it cannot be rectified through a process of
harmonization which uses Article 30 to compel all States to adhere to the lowest
common denominator.
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III. Sunday Trading
Sunday observance legislation might have been challenged under the
freedom of religion clause at Article 9(1) of the European Convention on
Human Rights.  Article 9(1) might support an argument similar to that accepted
by the Supreme Court of Canada in Edwards Books,95 namely that the
requirement to stop work on the Christian pause day imposes a special burden
on those individuals and groups whose religion requires them to observe a
different day of the week.  But who can blame the business-owners in Torfaen,
Conforama, Marchandise, and Stoke-on-Trent96 for challenging their national
Sunday legislation instead under the Treaty of Rome?  Unlike the European
Convention of Human Rights, the Treaty of Rome is directly effective and it
prevails over incompatible domestic legislation in all Member States.97
A. The Sunday Trading Cases as a Development of the
Cinéthèque Line
In the first of these cases to be decided, Torfaen Borough Council v. B
& Q plc, the Borough Council was attempting to enforce the Shops Act 1950,98
a British statute making it an offence for a store to open on Sundays in England
or Wales, except as provided for in a series of exceptions.  One storeowner
raised as a defence that the Shops Act violated Article 30 and should not be
applied.  Pursuant to Article 177 of the EEC Treaty, the local Magistrates’ Court
referred preliminary questions relating to the shop’s «Euro-defence» to the Court
of Justice.
The Court of Justice ruled as follows :
«Article 30 of the Treaty must be interpreted as meaning that the
prohibition which it lays down does not apply to national rules
prohibiting retailers from opening their premises on Sunday where the
restrictive effects on Community trade which may result therefrom do
not exceed the effects intrinsic to rules of that kind.99»
Note that since the Court of Justice does not have jurisdiction under Article 177
to rule on the compatibility of a particular piece of national legislation with
Community law, its ruling is phrased in general terms.  The ultimate «validity»
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of the British law would have to be determined by the national court, having
regard to the proportionality of the «restrictive effects» of the law on trade
within the Community. 100
The reasons offered by the Court of Justice for ruling that the prohibition
in Article 30 «does not apply» reveal that the ECJ applied Cinéthèque.  In its
judgment, the Court of Justice began by recalling that in Cinéthèque, the
impugned measure
«… was not compatible with the principle of the free movement of
goods provided for in the Treaty unless any obstacle to Community
trade thereby created did not exceed what was necessary in order to
ensure the attainment of the objective in view and unless that objective
was justified with regard to Community law.
In those circumstances it is therefore necessary in a case such as this
to consider first of all whether rules such as those at issue pursue an
aim which is justified with regard to Community law.101»
It would appear from these observations that the ECJ considered Sunday
legislation to be an obstacle to the free movement of goods.  Thus it fell to be
considered whether the measures could be justified under the principle of
derogation articulated in Cinéthèque.
The above excerpt from Torfaen is repeated in two subsequent Sunday
Trading judgments, Conforama and Marchandise.  In these two cases, the Court
of Justice dealt with challenges by retailers to the Labour Codes of France and
Belgium, respectively, which restricted the employment of staff on Sundays.  
 
In all three cases, the national court had asked the Court of Justice to
assume that some portion of the goods that the shops would have sold on Sunday
were imported goods.  In finding that the effect on the shops’ sales of imports
was as a matter of Community law a «restrictive effect on intra-Community
trade», the Court of Justice extended the «duty not to regulate» beyond the
context contemplated in Cassis de Dijon and Cinéthèque.
Unlike the situation in Cassis de Dijon and Cinéthèque, disparities
among national laws on retail hours had absolutely nothing to do with any
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reduction in the sales of imported products in the U.K., France or Belgium.  If
anything, differences in national policies in this regard might increase cross-
border trade in goods (as Ontario retailers’ recent experience illustrates).  This
point, which was raised by the Commission before the ECJ in Torfaen, was
rejected by the Advocate General and ignored in the judgment of the Court of
Justice.102  Advocate General Van Gerven’s response was that as long as the rule
prevents sales of imports which might otherwise occur in the absence of the rule,
it is a hindrance to intra-Community trade.103
Indeed, the ECJ now asserts that an obstacle to trade may arise in the
absence of any protectionist intent, disadvantagement, or disparity among
national laws.  I would suggest that in fact, if none of these features are present,
there is no barrier to trade : since there is no protectionism or legislative
disparity, the geographic allocation of production is not distorted.  In
consequence, the only trade effect of Sunday legislation is that which is
attributable to the «local distortion», namely the import component of the
disruption in consumption which arises because of the theoretical equivalency
of the regulation to a consumption tax.  But as I argued above,104 this effect is
common to all regulation,105 indeed to all interventions by the State in the
economy.  If even this impact on the flow of goods across boundaries is of a
nature to trigger Article 30, then almost any conceivable regulatory measure of
general application is also caught.  Moreover, elementary macroeconomic theory
tells us that any exercise of fiscal or monetary policy which affects aggregate
demand will have an impact on the level of imports.106  Are all of these measures
to be considered «measures having equivalent effect» unless they can be
justified as exigences impératives or under Article 36? 
The answer is no.  To find a violation of a fundamental principle of the
Common Market in those circumstances would be inconsistent with the idea that
the Member States have retained jurisdiction to regulate any aspect of their
domestic economy.  Aside from being antithetical to the principle of
subsidiarity,107 such an interpretation would be unreasonable because the
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Member States could not have intended in ratifying Article 30 to divest
themselves of their ability to develop and apply economic policies on their own
territories.108
There is no justification for the Court of Justice’s contention in Torfaen,
Conforama and Marchandise that a regulation can still be restrictive of
Community trade if it is applied indistinctly, is not discriminatory, and is
uniform throughout the Community.  Yet, the overall consistency of these
judgments with the ECJ’s reasoning in Cinéthèque and Cassis de Dijon is
striking.  In the two latter cases, although the evil addressed was the absence of
harmonization, the assumption on which the cases proceeded was that all
regulation has the potential to be distortive of trade within the Common Market.
The resulting preference for the lowest common denominator is not explicable
by a theory of optimal geographic allocation.  I have argued that only an
independent aversion to regulation can account for the approach to Article 30
asserted in the Cassis de Dijon-Cinéthèque line and in the Sunday Trading cases.
Article 30 was not meant to be interpreted in such a way as to require all
regulation to be justified as an exception to the principle of the free movement
of goods.  As White has argued,
«If Article 30 is allowed to become a quasi-constitutional instrument
which complainants and courts can use to question the justification
and «proportionality» of virtually all State measures regulating
society, then the Court of Justice will inevitably be led … either to
greater laxity in recognising measures as justified or to call into
question the direct applicability of Article 30.109»
The judgments rendered by the Court of Justice in Torfaen, Conforama and
Marchandise show that White was correct.
In fact, when Cassis de Dijon first introduced the concept of exigences
impératives, the Commission’s statement on its scope reflected the general
consensus about the standard of importance the overriding objective had to
meet:
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«Ce but doit être de nature à primer les exigences de la libre
circulation des marchandises qui constitue l’une des règles
fondamentales de la Communauté.110»
First weakened by the ambiguous reference in Cinéthèque to the
objective of protecting cinematography as being «justified in Community law»,
the concept of exigences impératives is now unrecognizable.111  In Torfaen, the
Court of Justice considered that the objective of the legislation was to «ensure
that working and non-working hours are so arranged as to accord with national
or regional socio-cultural characteristics», and that this objective was «a matter
for the member states.»112  Similar objectives in Conforama and Marchandise
were also held to be «a matter for the member states.»113
A fourth Sunday Trading case, decided near the end of 1992, confirmed
the trend.  Stoke-on-Trent involved a second reference relating to the Shops Act
1950.  This time, the Court of Justice did not even repeat the formulation
inspired by Cinéthèque, according to which Sunday closing legislation was
prima facie an obstacle to trade.  Instead, it simply noted the legitimacy of the
objective and the proportionality of the measure :
«[L]es législations en cause poursuivaient un but justifié au regard du
droit communautaire. … [L]es effets restrictifs sur les échanges d’une
réglementation nationale interdisant l’occupation de travailleurs
salariés le dimanche … n’apparaissent pas comme excessifs au regard
du but poursuivi.  La même constatation s’impose, pour les mêmes
raisons, en ce qui concerne une réglementation nationale qui interdit
aux commerces de détail d’ouvrir le dimanche.114»
Based on this observation, the Court of Justice concluded that Article 30 does
not apply to national Sunday closing legislation.115
Although the reference in the Sunday Trading cases to the legislative
objective and to the proportionality test confirms that the measures were
considered to derogate from the principle of free intra-Community trade, one is
left with the impression that the measures were acceptable not because of the
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imperative character of their objective but because of the absence of a
compelling integrationist principle.
B. Revival of the Theory of Disadvantage?
I have argued that despite purporting to follow the reasoning introduced
in Cassis de Dijon and Dassonville, the Court of Justice has emasculated the test
of justification for exigences impératives.  At the same time, however, an
additional consideration has surreptitiously been introduced : in Cinéthèque and
all four Sunday Trading cases, the Court of Justice began by observing that «the
marketing of products imported from other member states was not … made
more difficult than the marketing of domestic products» by the legislation.116
Only after making this observation did the ECJ proceed to consider whether the
objective was «a matter for the Member States» and proportionate to the
«restrictive effects on intra-Community trade».
Although the Court of Justice does not explain in any of these judgments
why the absence of discriminatory impact is relevant, it is certainly arguable that
new life has been breathed into the theory of disadvantage.  As I have pointed
out, Marenco’s theory had been widely rejected.117  The Court of Justice itself,
mysteriously analyzing the non-discriminatory legislation in Cinéthèque under
what everyone assumed was the Cassis de Dijon derogation (though without
mentioning the term «exigences impératives» or Cassis de Dijon), appeared to
have rejected it as well.  Yet, if legislation not having a discriminatory impact
is acceptable as long as it furthers (in a proportionate manner) an objective
which is «a matter for the Member States», one would be forgiven for
concluding that the Court of Justice has in effect embraced the «disadvantage»
theory.  The fact that non-discriminatory regulation is nevertheless branded by
the ECJ as having «restrictive effects on intra-Community trade» is of little
consequence if the regulation can be justified with no difficulty.
This is not to say that the situation following the Sunday Trading cases
is satisfactory.  In the first place, although both the Court of Justice and Marenco
now agree that non-discriminatory national legislation which is disproportionate,
even if it is enacted for a legitimate objective, may violate Article 30,118 this
proposition should be viewed with caution.  In my opinion, the proportionality
of a measure should not be considered unless the measure is prima facie a
barrier to trade.  If a measure is not formally discriminatory or discriminatory
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in its effect, then its proportionality is a matter for domestic law, since
disproportionate legislation which affects imports and domestic products equally
does not result in geographic misallocation of production.  It has of course been
argued in Canada that a provincial measure infringes on the federal power over
trade and commerce if its trade effects exceed those which are reasonably
necessary for the attainment of its objective.119  However, I would point out that
in the European Community, the impugned measures are those of sovereign
States.  The entire supra-national jurisdiction, including the ECJ, is a creation
of the Member States.  For this reason, Community institutions should be wary
of evaluating the proportionality of national measures unless there is a threat to
the free movement of goods.
A more important problem is that the Sunday Trading cases are merely
the current stage of the sparsely reasoned «evolution» of the ECJ’s jurisprudence
on the derogation from the free movement of goods.  Consequently, although in
effect we have a new definition of the free movement of goods coinciding
generally with that proposed by Marenco, it is unstable and is still perceived to
relate to an exceptional derogation from a fundamental principle of the Common
Market.120  Although the Stoke-on-Trent decision has definitively resolved the
Sunday closing issue, the wording of the decision suggests that it is specific to
the context of Sunday legislation.  The Court of Justice does not indicate in
Stoke-on-Trent that any new general principle has displaced Dassonville and
Cassis de Dijon.
This objection may be substantially addressed by the Court of Justice’s
subsequent ruling in Keck and Mithouard.121  In a preliminary ruling issued late
last year, the Court of Justice rules that Article 30 does not preclude national
legislation prohibiting reselling at a loss, in spite of the fact that some of the
products that might otherwise have been resold would have originated in other
Member States.  More importantly, the ECJ explains in its reasons that it is time
to «reexamine and clarify» Cassis de Dijon; and that «contrary to what had
previously been decided», indistinctly applicable and non-discriminatory
restrictions on marketing are generally not susceptible of hindering intra-
Community trade.  The Court of Justice’s comments regarding its jurisprudence
suggest that it finally recognizes that Cassis de Dijon cannot be taken at its face
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value.  I would argue that Keck and Mithouard eliminates the need to frame a
defence of national legislation in terms of an exigence impérative or derogation
from the principle of the free movement of goods.  Legislation which meets the
criteria proposed by Marenco will simply be presumed not to violate Article 30.
Conclusion
If the Court of Justice’s jurisprudence on Article 30 has been unstable,
it is in part because the «free movement of goods» is more a political slogan
than a legal principle.122  Thus, idealistic pronouncements such as the
Dassonville formula, combined with the enthusiastic adoption of the goal of
harmonization in Cassis de Dijon, created the impression that all regulation was
suspect.  However, Article 30 did not authorize the Court of Justice to
precipitate the harmonization of national laws simply by invalidating them.  And
even if the ECJ had wished to compel harmonization at the lowest common
denominator, the Member States would surely have balked.
Unwilling to sacrifice its idealistic interpretation of Article 30, but
lacking the authority to carry the interpretation to its logical conclusion, the
Court of Justice turned to the derogation to trim the scope of Article 30.  Starting
with Cassis de Dijon, and continuing through Cinéthèque to the Sunday Trading
cases, the derogation has been gradually relaxed.  As well, through the evolution
of the derogation, important criteria which had originally been rejected, such as
non-discrimination and evenhanded application, were discreetly introduced.
As a result, the current scope of Article 30 is not unreasonable.
Regrettably, however, the Court of Justice’s lack of candour and, in particular,
its failure to explain the status of Dassonville and Cassis de Dijon, have done
little to reduce the uncertainty surrounding Article 30.  Time may help to
moderate the instability of the first two decades of jurisprudence on import
restrictions, especially if the ECJ follows through its most recent decision, Keck
and Mithouard.123  This case, it is hoped, will be taken as a signal from the Court
of Justice that Cassis de Dijon must no longer be taken literally.
